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The Friedman-Savage Utility Function in 
Cross-cultural Perspective 
Frederic L. Pryor 
Swarthmore College 
A. Introduction 
In their classic article on the utility of wealth, Friedman and Savage 
(1948) tried to devise a utility function to explain a variety of apparently 
conflicting phenomena. For instance, why do people who normally do 
not play gambling games such as calling heads-or-tails participate in 
lotteries? And why do people who gamble also buy insurance? 
The purpose of this note is to show that the ideas underlying the Fried- 
man-Savage utility function can permit us to make accurate predictions 
about which precapitalist societies do and which do not engage in gambling. 
The supporting data are macroeconomic, and the tests are carried out 
using a simple multivariate least-squares regression analysis. 
B. The Utility-of-Wealth Function 
The Friedman-Savage utility function has a rather strange shape, which 
is shown in figure 1 below. The utility function is the curve U-U'. A 
person normally has wealth W. and experiences a utility U.. He now faces 
two different gambling situations, in both of which his expected wealth 
after the bet (i.e., the sum of the probability of winning multiplied by 
his wealth position if he won plus the probability of losing multiplied 
by his wealth position if he lost) is the same as his normal wealth situation. 
Some of the costs of writing this essay were financed by the Swarthmore College 
Faculty Research Fund, for which I express my gratitude. Useful comments on an earlier 
draft were graciously supplied by Van Doorn Ooms, Steven Piker, and Bernard Saffran. 
[Journal of Political Economy, 1976, vol. 84, no. 4, pt. 1] 
C) 1976 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 
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FIG. 1.-The Friedman-Savage utility function 
Determining whether the person will take either of the bets simply in- 
volves calculating his expected utility after the bet, which in turn is 
determined as the sum of the probability of winning multiplied by 
the utility of his wealth position if he won plus the probability of his 
losing multiplied by the utility of his wealth position if he lost. In the 
first bet, the person will have wealth position L if he loses and wealth 
position G if he wins. The weighted utilities of these two wealth positions 
falls somewhere on the line L-G and, given the odds mentioned above, 
this is at point P (where the line indicating the expected wealth outcome 
intersects line L-G). Since point P has a utility less than U,, the person 
will not take the bet. In the second bet, the person will have a wealth 
position L if he loses and a wealth position G' if he wins. The weighted 
utilities of these two wealth positions falls somewhere on the line L-G', 
and, given the odds mentioned above, this is at point P'. Since point P' 
has a utility more than U., the person will take the bet. 
Friedman and Savage tried to interpret the derived utility curve in 
terms of the entire society, an interpretation which was subjected to 
attack by Markowitz (1952). Nevertheless, the basic shape of this curve 
has been accepted for more than a quarter of a century. 
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Empirical verification of this function has rested, as far as I have been 
able to determine, exclusively on macroeconomic data. My macro- 
economic approach extends a number of macroeconomic propositions, 
and I focus my analytic attention particularly on the wiggle in the curve 
and the points left of point G'. I do not deal with situations in which the 
curve begins to show a marked diminishing marginal utility again to the 
right of point G'. 
C. The Test Situation and Alternative Hypotheses 
What kind of determinants can be used to predict the presence of gambling 
in a worldwide sample of 60 primitive and peasant societies? I draw 
several predictions from the Friedman-Savage utility function and then 
discuss a series of alternative hypotheses found in the anthropology 
literature. 
Before the Friedman-Savage utility function can be used as a basis for 
prediction, we must inquire briefly into the authors' underlying justifica- 
tions of the rising marginal utility of wealth. Most of their discussion is in 
terms of rationalizing the behavior of individuals who both gamble and 
take out insurance. However, such behavior is based on certain conditions 
in society. They suggest that the two convex segments correspond to 
"qualitatively different socioeconomic levels, and the concave segment 
to the transition between the two levels. On this interpretation, increases 
in income that raise the relative position of the consumer unit in its own 
class but do not shift the unit out of its class yield diminishing marginal 
utility, while increases that shift it into a new class, that give it a new 
social and economic status, yield increasing marginal utility" (pp. 
298-99). The greater the possibility of achieving such qualitatively 
different statuses, the greater the possibility of the presence of gambling. 
We can predict, therefore, that there should be a positive correlation 
between socioeconomic inequality and the presence of gambling in the 
various societies in the sample, a hypothesis validated below.1 
Another implication can also be drawn. Individuals in societies where 
members feel themselves close to the subsistence level of income should 
have a very high disutility of losing since (if they have average incomes) 
losing might bring them close to starvation; therefore, the presence of 
gambling should be inversely correlated with this condition. Unfortun- 
ately, the measurement of income level raises some difficult problems. 
' A hidden assumption in this argument is that social-class mobility is difficult and that 
gambling is one of the few easy channels of mobility. It should be added that this argument 
does not rest on any assumption about the utility of any given amount of wealth being the 
same for the individual societies or the utility functions being similar. Rather, I am 
assuming only that the utility-of-wealth functions have the same general shape (two 
segments with diminishing marginal utility of wealth, separated by a segment with an 
increasing marginal utility of wealth.) 
This content downloaded from 130.58.65.20 on Tue, 28 Apr 2015 19:55:19 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
824 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Sahlins (1972) presented convincing evidence that highly primitive 
hunting and gathering societies are nowhere near this subsistence point, 
as shown by the fact that members of most of these societies spend very 
little time searching for food. For instance, according to Lee (1968), 
the !Kung Bushmen of Botswana, who are among the most primitive 
peoples of the world, spend less than 20 percent of their work time looking 
for food. Boserup (1965) has presented more controversial evidence, 
showing that the most primitive agricultural groups who employ slash- 
and-burn agricultural techniques spend much less time farming than do 
farmers using much more "advanced" techniques. Since the food supply 
of these highly primitive societies can be increased by gathering natural 
products for a few more hours of the day, they should not feel close to the 
subsistence limit. Therefore, this subjective condition should not be corre- 
lated with the actual level of economic development, at least as con- 
ventionally measured by anthropologists such as Carneiro (1973) or 
Murdock and Provost (1973). 
It does seem reasonable to suspect that the long-term feeling of closeness 
to subsistence occurs where the yearly food supply is quite uncertain. 
One such situation occurs in "hard" environments such as arctic, semi- 
arctic, or desert environments, where climatic shifts are considerable 
and the food quest is very difficult. Another such situation occurs in that 
type of subsistence production in which the maintenance of a critical 
minimum capital stock is quite uncertain at all times for the various 
individuals in the society. Of the five modes of food production (hunting, 
gathering, fishing, herding, and farming), it has been argued (e.g., by 
Collins 1965) that such uncertainty is greatest in animal husbandry, 
where the herder must keep the size of the herd above a critical minimum 
and growing as fast or faster than the food needs of the herding family. 
In nomadic herding societies, where the entire food supply comes from 
the herds and a herd is in many different places during the course of the 
year, the dangers that the size of the herd may be reduced below the 
critical minimum by disease, theft, stampede, climatic occurrences, or 
accidents seem sufficiently great that gambling losses may have a very 
high disutility. Therefore, from considerations underlying the Freidman- 
Savage discussion, we can predict that the presence of gambling should be 
inversely related to hardness of the environment and also to reliance on 
nomadic herding; positive evidence for these predictions is presented 
below. 
In the anthropology literature, discussion about the determinants of 
gambling is much different and considerably less rigorous. Some of the 
studies are inductive correlation exercises (e.g., Roberts and Sutton- 
Smith 1966), while others attempt to trace the determinants of gambling 
to certain psychological variables such as values or attitudes induced 
by child-rearing practices. More interesting propositions come from 
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various ethnological studies in which authors are trying to explain the 
presence of gambling in the societies they are investigating. 
One common hypothesis from this latter literature is that gambling is 
related to the level of economic development. More specifically, the 
higher the developmental level, the greater the individualism in the society 
and also the greater the breakdown of "strict tribal morality," two factors 
which might contribute to violations of injunctions against gambling. 
In addition, it is argued that economic development is related to the 
domestic use of money for commercial purposes and that such money 
serves to facilitate gambling. We can test not only this relationship be- 
tween economic development and the presence of gambling but also 
particular aspects of the argument. For instance, we can test whether 
gambling is related to individualism by looking at proxies for individualism 
such as presence of nuclear (rather than extended) families and the absence 
of. important lineage structures. We can also test whether the presence 
of money influences the presence of gambling. 
Another kind of argument found in the anthropology literature rests on 
the possibility of cultural diffusion and comes in two versions. Version one 
is quite common: gambling arises from the cultural degeneracy which 
allegedly occurs upon extensive contact with the West. We can easily 
devise a measure for contact with the West; unfortunately, I expended 
much effort in coding various societies at periods in which such contact 
with the West was minimal, so that it is difficult to test this hypothesis 
satisfactorily with my data. Although, in fact, the calculated regression 
coefficient for the contact variable is not statistically significant, a certain 
verification is found by looking at particular cases. For instance, it is 
worth noting that at least three societies in my sample, namely the Truk 
Islanders of the Pacific, the Siane of New Guinea, and the Callinago 
Indians of the Caribbean, apparently did not aboriginally have gambling 
but adopted such practices after extensive Western contact. 
A second version of the diffusion argument arises from an observation 
by the famous anthropologist Robert Lowie (1934, p. 169), who observed 
that gambling is especially prevalent among the Indians of North America 
(north, that is, of Central America). He did not specify whether gambling 
was a trait brought by the original settlers of North America thousands 
of years ago and maintained by the various groups which split off to 
form separate societies or gambling was diffused more recently. Neverthe- 
less, I included a special location variable to take care of this contingency. 
A final argument which friends of mine have suggested extends another 
intrasocietal argument to an intersocietal level: in some societies most 
members are "risk lovers" and therefore practice gambling in order to 
fulfill this personal and cultural need. Manifestations of "risk loving" are 
reliance on modes of subsistence in which there is a high daily variation 
in supply (e.g., hunting and fishing) or where the environment is "hard". 
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Thus the risk-loving hypothesis predicts that gambling will be positively 
correlated with the hardness of the environment, while the economic 
considerations discussed above predict exactly the opposite relation. It 
turns out that this risk-loving hypothesis provides very poor predictors of 
the presence of gambling. 
D. The Sample 
There are 60 primitive and peasant societies in the sample used for in- 
vestigating the hypotheses discussed above, and they were drawn from 
all over the world. Murdock (1957) has divided the world up into 60 
cultural areas, and 58 of these are represented in the sample. More than 
85 percent of the 1,770 pairs of societies are more than 2,400 miles away 
from each other. Each society was coded for a particular year, usually in 
the second half of the nineteenth century, before much Western contact 
had occurred; however, this did not prove possible for some of the 
societies in the sample. 
The data for coding the societies were drawn from more than 1,200 
ethnographic sources; and this project represents a very small piece of 
a much larger comparative study of distribution in primitive and peasant 
societies (Pryor, forthcoming). My codings for the presence of gambling 
can be checked against the codings of Murdock and his associates for the 
presence of games of chance, and considerable agreement is obtained.2 
Difficulties in the coding of the independent variables was minimized 
in several different ways. First, only one coder (myself) made the various 
ratings, so that problems of interceder reliability did not arise. Second, 
the data on the independent variables were collected for a purpose 
much different from this examination of gambling, a fortuitous circum- 
stance which might minimize bias. Unfortunately, I did not have sufficient 
research funds to hire an independent coder so that independent ratings 
of the variables could be compared with mine. 
A list of the societies in the sample, along with the codings of the different 
variables, can be found in the appendices. Further details may be obtained 
from the author. 
E. The Calculations 
The coding of the presence of gambling was carried out in two different 
ways. In one coding I set up three dummy variables, where 0 = gambling 
not reported; 1 = gambling reported but not an important economic 
2 The codings on games of chance come from the Ethnographic Atlas, 1972 card version, 
obtained from the Ethnographic Atlas project of the Department of Anthropology, 
University of Pittsburgh. Of the 43 societies for which their and my codings could be 
compared, we agree on the presence or absence of gambling in 37 (86 percent) of these. 
There was no systematic bias shown in the error pattern of the six societies where our 
codings differed. 
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activity; and 2 = gambling reported as important economic activity. 
"Importance" represented my subjective judgment on the relative value 
of the goods changing hands in such activities as a percentage of total 
societal income. Another type of gambling variable was also examined 
(where the dummy variable had only two values, denoting whether 
gambling was present or not), but the explanatory power of these regres- 
sions was somewhat less, and the experiments were abandoned. Several 
alternative measures of the level of economic development were also in- 
vestigated and dropped because of lower explanatory power than the 
variable chosen. 
The dependent variable plus the 10 proposed independent variables 
are presented in table 1 below, along with their correlations. It should 
be noted that there is a certain amount of multicollinearity among the 
explanatory variables, and therefore we must adopt special procedures. 
The most simple is to select subsamples of variables and determine which 
groups lead to significant regression coefficients and the highest coefficients 
of determination; and this procedure was followed. The risk-loving 
hypothesis and the contact-with-the-West hypothesis quickly fell by the 
wayside. The variables connected with individualism (i.e., presence of 
lineages and the type of family) also did not seem very important and were 
dropped. The hardness-of-environment variable and the nomadic- 
herding variables are sufficiently correlated to each other that only one 
must be used in the statistical analysis; the latter was chosen because 
there was less subjectivity in its coding and also because it yielded some- 
what higher coefficients of determination, a fortunate congruence of 
events. 
In the final rounds of testing, five independent variables remained. The 
major difficulty arose in deciding whether the economic-development 
variable or the social-inequality variable should be retained in the regres- 
sion. If we calculate a regression with all five independent variables, the 
coefficient for the development variable is not statistically significant, 
while the coefficient for the inequality variable is. Further, the coefficient 
of determination for the regression if the development variable is dropped 
is somewhat higher than if the social-inequality variable is dropped. 
The final regression can be shown thus: 
PG = -0.2811 + 1.3302 LNA + 0.4151 DCM 
(.1514) (.1256) 
+ 0.2372 SI - 0.4299 NH R2 = .6757 
(.0746) (.1961) n = 60 
where PG = presence of gambling (0 = not present; 1 = present but 
unimportant or present and importance unascertainable; 2 = present and 
an important redistributive mode); LNA = location in North America 
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(excluding Central America and the Caribbean islands) (1 = yes; 
o = no); DCM = presence of a domestic commercial money (1 = yes; 
o = no); SI = presence of socioeconomic inequality (a five-point scale: 
I = little or no socioeconomic inequality; 5 = considerable socio- 
economic inequality); NH = society nomadic or seminomadic and more 
than half of its food supply coming from animal husbandry (1 = yes; 
o = no); R2 = coefficient of determination; n = size of sample; and 
numbers in parentheses = standard errors.3 
Several technical aspects of the regression deserve brief mention. 
First, this is the combination of four variables which has the highest 
coefficient of determination of any of the combinations which I tried. 
Second, the calculated regression coefficients are quite robust; when one 
of the variables is dropped from the calculations, there is not a great deal 
of change in the calculated slope coefficients of the other variables. 
The most important feature of the regression for this discussion is that 
the calculated coefficient for the socioeconomic-inequality variable is 
statistically significant, thus confirming a deduction from the Friedman- 
Savage utility analysis. The calculated coefficient for the nomadic herding 
variable is also statistically significant (at the .05 level) and confirms an- 
other aspect of the Friedman-Savage discussion. The significance of the 
coefficient for the money variable confirms a commonsense economic 
proposition which rests on intuitive notions about the implications of 
liquidity. The only variable reflecting considerations discussed in the 
anthropology literature is the location variable, which shows, I believe, 
that the presence of gambling depends not only upon the presence of 
money or social inequality or the absence of nomadic herding but also 
upon some sort of diffusion phenomenon which remains to be explored. 
In short, these results suggest that deductions from economic theory 
about gambling serve us well in examining economic systems much 
different from the industrialized, capitalist economies to which our 
theories refer. Further, we can derive from the strangely shaped Friedman- 
3 A problem in interpreting the statistical significance of the coefficients arises in the 
following manner: the presence of cultural diffusion of gambling among the 11 North 
American societies lowers the number of independent cases, and therefore our degrees of 
freedom are lowered. It is noteworthy, however, that the calculated coefficients of most 
of the variables in the regressions continue to have high t-scores, even when the variable 
representing the location factor is removed. For this reason, I do not believe that this 
problem of loss of degrees of freedom is serious. Additional statistical problems arise 
because the dependent variable is a dummy variable, which means that the estimators 
are unbiased but not efficient (Kmenta 1971, p. 427); and, further, because the error term 
is not normally distributed, the estimators of the constant coefficients are not normally 
distributed, and thus the classic tests of significance do not directly apply. However, since 
it was the size of the coefficient of determination which provided the key test for the choice 
of the combination of variables, rather than the t-test, I do not believe that investment in 
more sophisticated estimation techniques for the coefficients of the independent variables 
would have a very high payoff (especially since examination of the regression residuals 
did not suggest that the heteroscedasticity problem was very severe). 
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Savage utility function several propositions which receive impressive 
empirical validation from our sample of 60 primitive and peasant econo- 
mies. Although the presence of gambling among societies in the sample 
cannot be explained by exclusive reliance on propositions derived from 
the Friedman-Savage analysis, they certainly help us explain an im- 
portant part of the variance. 
Appendix A 
Societies in Sample 
The listing below gives the societies in the sample, alternative names, locations, 
and dates to which the data apply. 
1. Alor: Atimelang village, Alor, Lesser Sunda Islands, Indonesia; 1900 (before 
extensive contact with Chinese or Dutch). 
2. Amhara: Gondar district, Ethiopia; 1900 (before extensive reforms and 
changes). 
3. Ao Naga: Assam valley, India; 1885 (shortly before British conquest). 
4. Aweikdma: Dalbergia, Santa Catarina, Brazil; 1913 (before "pacification"). 
5. Azande [Zande, Niam-Niam]: primarily in northeast Zaire, but also Sudan 
and the Central African Republic; 1905 (before European administration). 
6. Aztec [Tenochca]: central Mexico; 1519 (shortly before arrival of Cortes). 
7. Basseri [Khamseh]: Fars, Iran; 1955 (shortly before Barth's fieldwork). 
8. Batak [Toba-Batak]: Sumatra; 1880 (shortly before intensive missionary 
work). 
9. Bhil: area around Rajpipla, Gujarat, India; 1935 (shortly before the field- 
work of Koppers). 
10. Bribri [Talamanca]: Costa Rica; 1866 (before strong Western influence). 
11. Callinago [Island Carib]: Dominica, Lesser Antilles; 1640 (at the time of 
early French visits). 
12. China [Kwangtung province peasant]: Nanching village, Kwangtung 
province, China; 1930 (before modern road put in). 
13. Comanche: Texas and Oklahoma, U.S.A.; 1850 (before "pacification"). 
14. Copper Eskimo: Coronation Gulf, Northwest Territories, Canada; 1910 
(before extensive Western contact). 
15. Dogon [Habe, Kado]: Sanga region, Mali; 1900 (before extensive Western 
contact). 
16. Fiji: Vanua Levu, Fiji; 1820 (before extensive Western contact). 
17. Eon [Dahomey]: Dahomey; 1860 (before end of slave trade and beginning 
of extensive Western influence). 
18. Ganda [Baganda]: Uganda; 1855 (before extensive Western contact). 
19. Gheg: Albania; 1912 (at year of independence from Turkey). 
20. Havasupai: Arizona, U.S.A., 1890 (before extensive Western contact). 
21. Inca: Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador; 1532 (shortly before Spanish conquest). 
22. Iroquois: New York, U.S.A.; 1700 (before extensive Western influence). 
23. Khalkha Mongol: Mongolia; 1910 (before gaining independence). 
24. Koryak [Reindeer Koryak, Chavchuven]: Kamchatka peninsula and ad- 
jacent areas; 1901 (at time of fieldwork of Jochelson). 
25. IKung Bushmen: Southwest Africa and Botswana; 1950 (shortly before 
fieldwork of the Marshall family). 
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26. Kwakiutl [Southern Kwakiutl]: Vancouver Island, British Columbia, 
Canada; 1860 (before extensive contact with the West). 
27. Lapp [Mountain Lapp]: Karesuando parish, Sweden; 1950 (shortly before 
fieldwork of Whitaker and Pehrson). 
28. Lepcha [Rong]: Sikkim; 1870 (before extensive Western contacts). 
29. Mandbo: Agusan valley, East Mindanao, Philippines; 1905 (at time of 
fieldwork of Garvan). 
30. Maori: north part of North Island, New Zealand; 1800 (before extensive 
white contact). 
31. Mundurucu: Cabria village, Para, Brazil; 1952 (at time of fieldwork of 
Murphy). 
32. Murngin [Wulamba]: east Arnhem land, Northern Territory, Australia; 
1926 (at time of fieldwork of Warner). 
33. Naskapi: north Labrador peninsula, Canada; 1880 (shortly before field- 
work of Turner). 
34. Navajo: Arizona and New Mexico, U.S.A.; 1860 (shortly before "pacifica- 
tion"). - _ 
35. Nuer: A Ali A-Nil, Sudan; 1920 (before "pacification"). 
36. Nyakyusa [Banyakyusa, Wanyakyusa]: southern highlands, Tanzania; 1890 
(shortly before missionary arrival). 
37. Omaha: Nebraska, U.S.A.; 1850 (before extensive Western contact). 
38. Pomo [Eastern Pomo]: Clear Lake, California, U.S.A.; 1847 (shortly before 
California gold rush). 
39. Rif [Aith Waryaghar Rif]: Morocco; 1920 (before major changes). 
40. Rwala [Rwala Bedouin]: Syria, Jordan, and north Arabia; 1905 (at begin- 
ning of fieldwork of Musil). 
41. Semang [Orang-Utan, Sakai]: northwest Malaysia; 1924 (at time of first 
fieldwork by Schebesta). 
42. Serbia: Sumadija region, Serbia, Yugoslavia; 1910 (before Serbian-Turkish 
war). 
43. Shavante [Akwe-Shavante, Chavante, Xavante]: central plateau, east Mato 
Grosso, Brazil; 1950 (before extensive Western contact). 
44. Siane: Goroka subdistrict, eastern highlands, New Guinea; 1944 (before 
Western contact). 
45. Siriond: eastern Bolivia; 1940 (at time of fieldwork by Holmberg). 
46. Suku [BaSuku, Pindi]: Kwango district, Zaire; 1915 (before extensive con- 
tact with West). 
47. Tanala [Menabe Tanala]: Malagasy; 1890 (before extensive contact with 
the West). 
48. Thonga [BaThonga]: Mozambique; 1870 (before beginning of fieldwork of 
Junod). 
49. Tikopia: Santa Cruz Island, Solomon Islands; 1928 (at beginning of 
Firth's fieldwork). 
50. Tiv [Munshi]: eastern central Nigeria; 1900 (before extensive Western 
contact) . 
51. Toba [Eastern Toba, Toba-Pilaga, Pitilaga, Takshik, Komlik]: Chaco and 
Formosa provinces, Argentina; 1860 (before lumber mills and military campaigns). 
52. Toda: Nilgrili hills, Madras, India; 1901 (at time of Rivers's fieldwork). 
53. Trobriand: Kiriwina district, Boyowa Island, Trobriand Islands; 1914 (at 
time of Malinowski's fieldwork). 
54. Truk: Romonum Island, Truk Islands, Caroline Islands; 1895 (before 
extensive Western or Japanese contact). 
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TABLE B1 
SAMPLE SOCIETIES AND CODED VARIABLES 
VARIABLES 
SOCIETY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Alor ................ 1 0 0 1 38 0 0 0 2.0 1 0 
Amhara ............. 1 0 0 1 58 1 0 0 4.0 1 0 
Ao Naga ............. 1 0 0 1 33 1 0 0 2.2 1 0 
Aweik6ma ........... 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 1 1.4 0 0 
Azande .............. 0 0 0 1 41 0 0 0 2.0 0 0 
Aztec ............... 2 0 0 1 56 1 0 0 4.5 1 1 
Basseri .............. 0 0 1 1 25.5 1 1 0 2.5 0 0 
Batak ............... 2 0 0 1 34 1 0 0 3.2 1 0 
Bhil ................. 0 0 0 1 47 1 1 0 2.5 1 0 
Bribri ............... 0 0 0 2 24 1 0 0 1.5 1 0 
Callinago ............ 0 0 0 1 27 0 0 1 1.8 0 0 
China ............... 2 0 0 1 60 1 0 0 3.3 1 0 
Comanche ........... 2 0 0 1 16 1 0 1 2.3 0 1 
Copper Eskimo ....... 1 1 0 1 9 0 0 1 1.4 0 1 
Dogon ............... 1 0 0 1 48 1 0 0 2.7 1 0 
Fiji ................. 0 0 0 1 45 0 0 0 2.3 1 0 
Fon ................ 1 0 0 2 51 1 1 0 4.8 1 0 
Ganda .............. 0 0 0 1 49 1 0 0 3.3 1 0 
Gheg ...1........... I 0 0 2 50 1 0 0 2.0 1 0 
Havasupai ........... 2 0 0 1 14.0 0 0 0 1.3 0 1 
Inca ................. 1 0 0 1 52 0 0 0 4.7 0 0 
Iroquois ............. 2 0 0 1 28 0 0 0 1.8 1 1 
Khalka Mongol ....... 1 1 1 1 39 1 1 0 3.3 0 0 
Koryak .............. 0 1 1 1 12 0 1 0 2.2 0 0 
!Kung Bushmen ...... 0 0 0 1 4.0 0 0 0 1.2 0 0 
Kwakiutl ............ 2 0 0 1 29 1 0 1 2.5 1 1 
Lapp ............... 0 1 1 1 20.5 1 1 0 1.8 0 0 
Lepcha ............. 0 0 0 1 40 0 0 0 2.3 1 0 
Man6bo ............. 0 0 0 1 22 0 0 0 1.8 0 0 
Maori .............. 0 0 0 1 42 0 0 0 3.2 0 0 
Mundurucd ......... 0 0 0 1 11 0 1 0 1.3 1 0 
Murngin ............. 0 0 0 1 4.0 0 0 0 1.2 1 0 
Naskapi ............. 1 1 0 1 7 0 1 1 1.1 0 1 
Navajo .............. 2 1 0 2 23 0 1 0 2.0 1 1 
Nuer ............... 0 0 0 1 19 0 0 0 1.9 1 0 
Nyakyusa ........... 0 0 0 1 31 0 0 0 2.4 0 0 
Omaha .............. 2 0 0 1 17 0 1 0 2.3 1 1 
Pomo ............... 2 0 0 1 18 1 0 0 1.7 0 1 
Rif ................. 0 0 0 1 55 1 1 0 2.5 1 0 
Rwala .............. 0 1 1 1 37 1 1 0 2.4 1 0 
Semang ............. 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1.2 0 0 
Serbia ............... 1 0 0 1 57 1 1 0 2.8 1 0 
Shavante ............ 0 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 1.0 1 0 
Siane ................ 0 0 0 1 10 1 0 0 1.5 1 0 
Siriono .............. 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1.3 0 0 
Suku ............... 1 0 0 1 44 1 0 0 2.0 1 0 
Tanala .............. 1 0 0 2 43 1 0 0 2.3 1 0 
Thonga .............. 0 0 0 2 35 0 0 0 2.4 1 0 
Tikopia .............. 0 0 0 1 30 0 0 0 2.5 1 0 
Tiv ................. 1 0 0 2 46 1 0 0 2.3 1 0 
Toba ............... 1 0 0 1 14.0 0 0 1 2.2 0 0 
Toda ............... 0 0 0 1 20.5 0 0 0 2.2 1 0 
Trobriand ........... 0 0 0 1 25.5 0 0 0 2.3 1 0 
Truk ............... 1 0 0 2 32 1 0 0 2.0 1 0 
Tuareg .............. 0 1 1 1 36 0 0 0 3.0 1 0 
Turkey .............. 1 0 0 1 59 1 1 0 2.8 0 0 
Warao .............. 0 0 0 2 14.0 0 0 0 2.0 1 0 
Wolof ............... 1 0 0 1 53 1 1 0 2.5 1 0 
Yahgan .............. 0 1 0 1 4.0 0 0 0 1.00 0 
Yaqui ............... 1 0 0 1 54 1 1 0 1.8 0 1 
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55. Tuareg [Ahaggar Tuareg]: Ahaggar area, Algeria; 1898 (before French 
military occupation). 
56. Turkey [Turk]: Sakaltutan and Elbasi villages, central Anatolia; 1950 (at 
beginning of Stirling's fieldwork). 
57. Warao [Warrau, Guaraunos]: Orinoco delta, Venezuela; 1920 (before 
introduction of Western agricultural techniques). 
58. Wolof [Ouolof]: Senegal and Gambia; 1875 (before conquest by French). 
59. Yahgan [Yamana]: Tierra del Fuego, Chile; 1850 (before missionaries). 
60. Yaqui: Sonora, Mexico, and Arizona, U.S.A.; 1930. 
Description of Data Series 
1. Presence of gambling: 0 = none reported; 1 = some reported but either 
not important or importance unascertainable; 2 = gambling reported and an 
important redistributive mode. 
2. Hardness of the environment: 1 = hard environment (e.g., arctic, semi- 
arctic, or desert); 0 = not hard environment. 
3. Nomadic herding: 1 = animal husbandry accounts for more than 50 percent 
of food supply, and society is either nomadic or seminomadic; 0 = one or both of 
these conditions are not filled. (Further details on the coding of this variable may 
be found in Pryor, forthcoming). 
4. Unit of observation: 1 = nuclear family (monogamous, polygynous, poly- 
androus) or small extended family; 2 = extended family. (Further details on 
this variable may be found in Pryor, forthcoming). 
5. Rank order of level of economic development: 1 = rank of lowest level; 
60 = rank of highest level. The decimal points indicate tie-scores. (Ranking 
follows an approach used by Carneiro 1973; further details may be found in 
Pryor, forthcoming). 
6. Presence of a domestic money used for commercial purpose: I = yes; 0 = 
no. (Excluded from consideration were noncommercial moneys and moneys used 
exclusively in external trade). 
7. Contact with the West: 0 = no contact, occasional contact, or light mis- 
sionary activity; 1 = considerable contact, heavy missionary work, or consider- 
able contact with Western government officials, colonists, visitors, or traders. 
8. Hunting and/or fishing accounting for 50 percent or more of total food sup- 
ply: 1 = yes; 0 = no. 
9. Socioeconomic inequality, computed as an average of six five-point scales 
indicating inequality of total income, inequality of consumption, inequality of 
ownership of property, inequality of menial work carried out, inequality of total 
work carried out, and inequality in the holding of technological knowledge: 
I = least inequality; 5 = greatest inequality. (These scales were subjectively 
coded.) 
10. Important presence of extensive lineages, defined in terms of group eco- 
nomic activities (lineages include patrilineal, matrilineal, duolineal, and ambi- 
lineal groups): 1 = yes; 0 = no. 
11. Presence in North America (excluding Central American and Caribbean 
islands): 1 = yes; 0 = no. 
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